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Thinking positively: Optimism and emotion 
regulation predict interpretation of ambiguous 
information
Nakia S. Gordon1*, Samantha A. Chesney1 and Katherine Reiter1
Abstract: The way individuals interpret their worlds is influenced by emotion and its regu-
lation. Indeed, negative affect typically increases negative interpretations of ambiguous 
stimuli and may have a role in dysfunctional psychosocial function. Yet, it is not currently 
known whether explicit and implicit emotion regulation can counteract this effect. To ad-
dress this question, undergraduates (N = 103) used cognitive reappraisal under angry and 
control mood states to disambiguate sentences by selecting either a neutral, positive, or 
negative word. While explicit cognitive reappraisal decreased negative affect, it had no ef-
fect on interpretation of ambiguity. Still, reported use of reappraisal predicted decreased 
negative and increased positive interpretations. Further, dispositional characteristics such 
as anger and optimism were key factors in how participants interpreted ambiguity. These 
findings suggest that regulating emotion may not be sufficient for influencing cognitive 
interpretations. Yet, individuals who are optimistic and are able to successfully regulate 
their emotions are less prone to negative interpretations even under angry mood states. 
This has implications for skill development in individuals with emotional disorders.
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1. Introduction
Ambiguity requires appropriate interpretation and action for successful psychosocial functioning. 
Circumstances involving ambiguity are not only imbued with integral emotions resulting from an 
interpretation of a situation (e.g. feeling anxiety in the face of a social threat) but also incidental 
emotions (e.g. anger) that we bring to the situation. Since incidental emotions alter the way we in-
terpret ambiguity (Mathews, 2012), regulating our emotions is not only a crucial act for adaptive 
functioning (Gross, 2002), but may also influence the way we interpret the uncertain world around 
us. Examining the relationship between emotion regulation (ER) and the interpretation of ambiguity 
can deepen our understanding of how people resolve uncertainty under varying degrees of emo-
tional influence.
Researchers have established that state emotion influences the resolution of ambiguity, and it is 
often aligned with the valence and appraisal tendencies of that emotional state (Lerner & Keltner, 
2000). A common empirical approach to investigate the resolution of ambiguity is to employ an in-
terpretation bias model. In such models, participants are asked to disambiguate words or scenarios 
that have multiple meanings, with valenced (i.e. neutral, positive, or negative) choices. When partici-
pants tend toward one valence to disambiguate stimuli relative to another, an interpretation bias is 
said to have occurred (Mathews, 2012). Work in this area demonstrates that in an affectively neutral 
state, participants tend almost equally toward neutral or positive interpretations (Mathews, 2012). 
However, in induced emotional states, such as anxiety and anger, increased negative interpretations 
and decreased positive ones tend to occur (Barazzone & Davey, 2009; Wenzel & Lystad, 2005). 
Ecologically, the influence of emotional states on interpretation and action could result in either 
adaptive or maladaptive responses to the environment.
Maladaptive responses often result from the unregulated emotional states that are observed in 
individuals with unregulated anxiety or depression. It is well established that trait anxiety increases 
negative and threatening interpretations of ambiguous stimuli (Amin, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Byrne & 
Eysenck, 1993; Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991; Richards, Reynolds, & French, 1993). 
Similarly, self-report measures of depression (Dineen & Hadwin, 2004) and anxiety (Hindash & Amir, 
2012; Huppert, Pasupuleti, Foa, & Mathews, 2007) have been positively correlated with negative in-
terpretations. Additionally, Hirsch and Mathews (1997, 2000) demonstrated that decreased positive 
interpretations (lack of positivity bias) are also a function of depression and anxiety. These findings 
suggest that even beyond incidental mood, dispositional mood may be a key factor in how partici-
pants interpret ambiguous stimuli. To that end, it would be worthwhile to investigate whether dispo-
sitional mood combined with incidental mood could further predict the interpretation of ambiguity. 
This would provide a better understanding of the emotional composition that leads to different 
types of interpretations.
Indeed, researchers are identifying that emotional reactivity is but one component of one’s emo-
tional composition. ER also influences the way we respond to stimuli (Gross, 2002). For example, it is 
established that the ER strategy of reappraisal decreases anger (Szasz, Szentagotai, & Hofmann, 
2011), and individuals high in trait reappraisal become less angry under experimental conditions 
(Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 2007). Since anger increases negativity bias, it would be beneficial to know 
whether regulating anger minimizes that bias. There are no known studies examining anger regula-
tion and interpretation bias together, but researchers have successfully altered interpretations using 
related cognitive bias modification paradigms (Hayes, Hirsch, Krebs, & Mathews, 2010; Salemink & 
van den Hout, 2010). In these paradigms, ambiguous scenarios are presented and their resolutions 
are experimentally manipulated such that the scenarios become benign, positive, or negative. When 
participants later resolve novel ambiguous scenarios, they do so consistent with their experimental 
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condition. Thus, procedures that modify the way participants interpret information appear success-
ful. Identifying a strategy that could decrease negative interpretations in the face of emotional re-
activity would have even greater implications for minimizing poor psychosocial outcomes.
Further, there are likely other dispositional traits that reduce rather than increase negative bias. 
One candidate trait is optimism. Optimism is consistently associated with positive interpretations 
(Sharot, 2011) and positive psychosocial outcomes (Hershberger, 2005). Yet, it also appears to be 
heightened in negative states such as anger. For instance, during anger, individuals take more risks, 
have a greater expectation of success, and are more likely to engage in approach behaviors (Lerner 
& Keltner, 2001). Anger makes individuals feel optimistic and confident about their decisions, which 
allows them to take swift action through heuristic appraisal tendencies (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). This 
optimistic outlook can be advantageous in a scenario where one needs to defend herself and is pre-
pared to do so before she has absolute certainty about the offense. Even still, dysregulated anger is 
associated with poor social and health outcomes (Denollet, Gidron, Vrints, & Conraads, 2010; Erwin, 
Heimberg, Schneier, & Liebowitz, 2003; Gouin, Kiecolt-Glaser, Malarkey, & Glaser, 2008; Waller et al., 
2003). Exploring the role of trait optimism may illuminate whether an optimistic disposition has a 
role in counteracting the effects of negative affect and thus minimizing negative interpretations. 
Given these collective findings, and the gap in the literature that remains, the current study aimed 
to understand the role of cognitive reappraisal on interpretation bias during an angry mood state, 
while also considering the context of important dispositional factors such as optimism, degree of 
negative affect, and ER ability.
2. Current study
In the current study, mood induction procedures (MIP) were used to elicit control and angry moods 
in participants. Immediately following an MIP, participants were cued to regulate the mood by pres-
entation of the word “attend” or “reappraise”. Interpretation bias was then tested through a sen-
tence completion task in which participants selected a neutral, positive, or negative word to 
disambiguate sentences. This method allowed us to determine whether ER decreased explicit self-
report of angry mood as well as whether it influenced implicit interpretation of ambiguous scenarios. 
Evaluating whether ER is effective at managing both mood and cognitions has implications for how 
to assist individuals who may have dysregulated emotions and poor psychosocial functioning.
Mood was induced via autobiographical recall, and we expected affect to remain relatively un-
changed between the baseline and control conditions. However, we expected increased negative 
and decreased positive affect in the anger-attend condition relative to control and anger-reappraise. 
In line with previous interpretation bias studies, we expected participants to select approximately 
equal numbers of neutral and positive words while selecting significantly fewer negative ones to 
disambiguate sentences at baseline and after the control conditions. After the anger induction, we 
expected a significant increase in the number of negative interpretations and a decrease in the 
number of positive interpretations relative to the control state (Barazzone & Davey, 2009; Hayes 
et al., 2010). We expected that after anger was reappraised, participants would make similar choices 
to disambiguate sentences as they did in the control state. Specifically, we expected no significant 
differences between interpretations made during the control and angry-reappraise conditions. 
However, we expected fewer negative and more positive interpretations when anger-reappraise 
was compared to anger-attend.
We evaluated scores from self-report measures of anger, anxiety, depression, and optimism to 
determine how these variables influenced interpretation bias. We expected state and dispositional 
moods to interact such that negative interpretations would be positively predicted by negative char-
acteristics at baseline and when attending to anger since these traits have been associated with 
negative bias in past studies (Barazzone & Davey, 2009; Huppert et al., 2007). After reappraisal, we 
expected anger to no longer significantly predict responses. We expected optimism to directly pre-
dict positive responses and inversely predict negative responses across all conditions.
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Finally, we evaluated the ability of individuals to regulate their emotions in general, and to reap-
praise during the sentence completion task. We expected difficulties with ER to predict negative in-
terpretations when attending to anger and reappraising it. Participants’ ability to reappraise during 
the task was expected to positively predict positive interpretations during the angry-reappraise task.
3. Method
3.1. Participants
Participants included 103 undergraduate students (18–23 years; Mage = 19) recruited through a re-
search participant pool. Sixty-three percent of the sample was white and 56% were female. None of 
the participants met the exclusion criteria which included being under the care of a psychiatrist or a 
psychologist or using medication for the treatment of any Axis I mood disorder. This sample size was 
sufficient for the statistical analyses based on a priori estimation (Soper, 2015). Experimental proce-
dures were approved by the University’s Internal Review Board. Written informed consent was ob-
tained from each participant who received partial course credit for their participation.
3.2. Self-report measures
3.2.1. Mood and anxiety symptom questionnaire-short form
(MASQ; Watson & Clark, 1991). The MASQ is a 62-item questionnaire that assesses mood and anxiety 
symptoms. This measure is appropriate for our non-clinical sample as it is able to detect subclinical 
levels of anxiety and depression. Participants read through a list of feelings, sensations, and prob-
lems, and were asked to indicate the degree to which they experienced them in the last week on a 
five-point Likert scale, 1 indicating “not at all” and 5 indicating “extremely”. The MASQ score has four 
subscales. The General Distress: Anxiety and General Distress: Depression subscales measure non-
specific symptoms of anxiety and depression. The Anxious Arousal subscale measures physiological 
symptoms of anxiety. The Anhedonic Depression subscale examines general negativity and activity 
level. The MASQ has shown good convergent validity across all subscales (r  >  .71 for all scales 
(Watson, 2005).
3.2.2. State–trait anger expression inventory-2
(STAXI-2; Spielberger, Sydeman, Owen, & Marsh, 1999) was used to assess feelings of anger. The 
STAXI-2 is a 57-item measure that examines current feelings of anger, as well as trait displays of 
anger involving temperament and mood expression. Participants read statements and indicated the 
amount to which they both currently and typically identify with each statement. Higher scores indi-
cate a greater degree of feelings or expression of anger. This measure has displayed high internal 
consistency (Spielberger et al., 1999).
3.2.3. Life orientation test-revised
(LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) is a 10-item questionnaire used to measure trait optimism. 
Three items are phrased in a positive way and three in a negative manner, while the remaining four 
items are used as fillers. Participants read each statement and indicated using a five-point Likert 
scale the degree to which they agreed or disagreed.
3.2.4. Difficulties in ER scale
(DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The DERS is a 36-item measure that assesses dysfunction in emotion 
regulation. Participants used a five-point Likert scale to indicate the degree to which each sentence 
applied to them (1 = “almost never”; 5 = “almost always”). Emotion dysregulation is determined by 
summing across all sentences, with high scores indicating a greater level of emotion dysregulation. 
The DERS has high internal consistency (α = .93) and construct validity as measured by statistically 
significant correlations between the DERS and the Generalized Expectancy for Negative Mood 
Regulation Scale (Gratz & Roemer, 2004).
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3.2.5. The ER questionnaire-short form
(ERQ-SF; Egloff, Schmukle, Burns, & Schwerdtfeger, 2006) is a six-item questionnaire used to retro-
spectively assess the type of ER strategy used when participants were instructed to reappraise an-
ger. The questionnaire has two subscales—Reappraisal and Suppression—three items assessing 
reappraisal and three assessing suppression. Items were summed to obtain a score for each scale.
3.3. Stimuli
3.3.1. Mood induction procedure
Each participant underwent angry and control mood induction procedures (MIP). Prior to the experi-
mental tasks, participants were asked to identify two anger-inducing events during which they felt 
extremely angry, and when recalling the event they still felt strong frustration, irritation, and/or an-
ger. For the control MIP, participants were instructed to identify their typical morning or evening 
routine (e.g. getting ready for school or work, or eating dinner watching TV).
In each MIP, participants were instructed to write about one of the events in the form of a narra-
tive that would clearly convey to another person the anger (or routine) the participant experienced. 
Participants were given 5 min to write about the event, but were able to proceed to the next task if 
they finished before the allotted time. After writing each narrative, participants were given 30 s to 
reflect on and re-experience the event. Several studies have found that the use of autobiographical 
recall is an effective technique to induce targeted emotions (Jallais & Gilet, 2010; Lench, Flores, & 
Bench, 2011). Additionally, the use of multiple memories for the same targeted state is effective at 
inducing that state (Kross, Davidson, Weber, & Ochsner, 2009).
3.3.2. Emotion regulation task
To acquaint participants with the ER task, a trained research assistant first explained the difference 
between “Attend” (to experience emotions that surface without trying to alter them) and 
“Reappraise” (to reinterpret the content to be less negative) (see procedures in Ray, McRae, Ochsner, 
and Gross Ray, McRae, Ochsner, & Gross, 2010). Participants practiced the strategies with images 
from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997) so that train-
ing was standardized. Participants had four trials (two each of attend and reappraise) with neutral 
and negative pictures. In the experimental procedures, participants were instructed to attend to or 
reappraise the emotions that resulted from the MIP. Attend and reappraise prompts were counter-
balanced across participants.
3.3.3. Sentence completion task
The sentence completion task consisted of 30 first-person sentences modified from existing sen-
tence completion paradigms (Barton, Morley, Bloxham, Kitson, & Platts, 2005; Beard & Amir, 2009; 
Bloom & Fischler, 1980; Eysenck et al., 1991; Huppert et al., 2007; Loevinger, 1985). Sentences were 
selected to (1) illustrate ambiguous situations pertaining to physical threat, social threat, or opti-
mism; and (2) only be disambiguated by completion of the last word. Each item of the sentence 
completion task began with a two-sec fixation point, followed by a screen presenting the sentence 
for six sec. Items were consistent across participants for each condition (e.g. baseline and/or angry-
attend), but randomly presented. Participants were asked to disambiguate each sentence using a 
forced-choice response style in which they selected a word from a set of three answer choices that 
included one positive, one negative, and one neutral choice. There were no time constraints on se-
lecting a response.
4. Procedure
Participants were asked to attend one, 60-min, experimental session. Upon arrival, they read and 
signed a consent form. They were then directed to a private room in which all study procedures took 
place on a 22-inch computer. Participants began by completing the demographics questionnaire, 
MASQ, STAXI-2, LOT-R, and DERS using Google docs. E-Prime software (Version 2; Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc.) was used for the remainder of the experimental procedures.
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4.1. Baseline and training
The experimental procedures began with baseline emotion ratings using an automated 10-cm visu-
al analog scale (VAS), anchored with “not at all” (0) and “extremely” (10). To reduce demand char-
acteristics and to capture the full range of affective states participants experience (Mauss et al., 
2007; Salemink & van den Hout, 2010), 10 affect descriptors were presented and rated separately: 
amused, angry, annoyed, anxious, excited, happy, joyful, negative affect, peaceful, and sad. Next, 
baseline interpretation bias was assessed with six items from the sentence completion task. Then, 
participants practiced attending and reappraising with the standardized emotional stimuli.
4.2. Testing
Participants completed each ER task (attend and reappraise) for each MIP (control and angry). These 
were counterbalanced across participants such that there were four conditions. In each condition, 
the ER order remained constant across MIPs. For example: Condition 1. Control-Attend, Control-
Reappraise, Angry-Attend, Angry-Reappraise; Condition 2. Control-Reappraise, Control-Attend, 
Angry-Reappraise, Angry-Attend. This pattern would follow for conditions 3 and 4 but with Anger 
being induced first. Participants rated their subjective affect before and after completing the first 
MIP. Next, they engaged in the first ER task. The word “Attend” or “Reappraise” was displayed for 4 s. 
Participants were then asked to rate the degree of negative affect they were experiencing on a VAS 
anchored by weak (0) and strong (10). This was followed by six items from the sentence completion 
task. Participants then underwent a second MIP in the targeted state. Again, they rated negative 
affect before and after the MIP, engaged in emotion regulation, and then performed the sentence 
completion task. Once these tasks were complete, participants viewed the word “RELAX” for 5 s. 
Participants then followed the same procedures for the other MIP. Once experimental procedures 
were complete, participants completed the ERQ-SF for both the angry and control MIPs.
5. Results
All statistical analyses were analyzed using an alpha level of .05 in SPSS 21.0 (SPSS, 2012). This 2 
(mood induction: control, angry) x 2 (emotion regulation: attend, reappraise) mixed model design 
was counterbalanced such that there were four conditions. There were no order effects of mood 
(positive, negative, and negative affect) or ER across conditions. Thus, data were collapsed across 
condition and ER order and analyzed as a repeated-measures design.
5.1. Data reduction and manipulation checks
Consistent with other studies (e.g. (Salemink & van den Hout, 2010), ratings of the individual emo-
tion descriptors—angry, annoyed, anxious, and sad—were averaged for a composite “negative” 
score. Likewise, ratings of amused, excited, happy, joyful, and peaceful were averaged to create a 
composite “positive” score. Separately, we confirmed that participants experienced the same mean 
(±SEM) “negative affect” across the two anger MIPs [MIP1: (6.38 ± .21) and MIP2 (6.13 ± .20); t (102), 
p = 0.24] to exclude the possibility that any differences in the dependent variables were a result of 
emotional differences in the angry MIPs.
To determine whether participants entered the study with the neutral/positive bias often observed 
in typically healthy participants, a bias scored was calculated. Bias was established by summing 
each response type (neutral, positive, or negative) across the six sentences. Thus, a positive bias oc-
curred, for example, if a participant endorsed more positive words across the six sentences than 
neutral or negative. A chi-square goodness of fit test confirmed that participants had a positive/
neutral bias at baseline (Χ2(2) = 26.75, p < .001), with more positive (N = 36) and neutral (N = 35) bi-
ases than negative (N = 5) ones.
5.2. Effect of mood induction
To evaluate the effect of mood inductions (baseline, control, or angry) on ratings of subjective affect, 
we conducted two repeated-measures (rm) analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests. There were 
 significant differences between the baseline, control, and angry inductions for both “negative” 
(F (2, 190) = 134.49, p < .001, partial η2 = 0.59) and “positive” (F (2, 190) = 92.31, p < .001, partial 
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η2 = 0.49) composite scores. Follow-up pairwise comparisons demonstrated the mean (±SEM) nega-
tive score was significantly higher during the anger induction (6.17  ±  .18) compared to baseline 
(3.15 ± .18) and control (3.50 ± .18) inductions (ps < .001). Conversely, the mean positive score was 
significantly lower for the angry (3.03 ± .19) induction relative to baseline (5.36 ± .18) and control 
(5.10 ± .16) inductions (ps < .001). These data support the hypothesis that anger induction would 
increase negative and decrease positive affect both relative to baseline and the control mood induc-
tions. Further, the control induction effectively maintained the participants’ baseline state.
5.3. Effect of emotion regulation
5.3.1. Negative Affect
Effects of ER on ratings of negative affect were analyzed with a 2 (MIP: control, angry) x 2 (ER: attend, 
reappraise) rm ANOVA. There were significant main effects of MIP (F (1, 101) = 122.09, p < .001) and 
ER (F (1, 101)  =  31.57, p  <  .001), which were moderated by the significant MIP by ER interaction 
(F (1, 101) = 8.98, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.08). Figure 1 illustrates that mean [95% CI] negative affect 
was significantly lower during reappraise compared to attend, for the angry induction (t (102) = 5.76, 
p < 0.001) but not the control induction. Thus, as hypothesized, instructed reappraisal effectively 
decreased negative affect in the angry MIP. It had no effect on the relatively low ratings of negative 
affect in the control MIP.
5.3.2. Interpretation Bias
To evaluate the effect of mood and ER on interpretation responses (neutral, positive, or negative), 
three 2 (MIP: control, angry) x 2 (ER: attend, reappraise) rm ANOVA tests were conducted separately. 
There was a significant main effect of MIP on both the neutral (F(1,101) = 12.99, p <  .001, partial 
η2 = .11) and negative (F(1,101) = 4.43, p = .038, partial η2 = .04) responses. Specifically, there were 
more mean (± SEM) neutral responses in the control MIPs (2.84  ±  .09) relative to angry MIPs 
(2.49 ± .08) (p < .001). Conversely, there were more negative responses in the angry MIPs (1.38 ± .10) 
relative to the control MIPs (1.17 ± .09) (p < .05). There was no significant difference in positive re-
sponses (F(1,101) = 2.39, n. s.) between the MIPs (Control: 2.00 ± .09; Angry: 2.15 ± .11) . None of the 
other main effects or interactions were significant. Thus, mood, but not emotion regulation, had an 
effect on interpretation bias.
5.4. Interpretation bias and participant variables
To evaluate whether participant characteristics and ER influence interpretation bias in the context of 
anger, a series of multiple linear regression analyses were conducted. Mood variables including an-
ger measured by the STAXI-2; anxiety measured by the MASQ (general distress: anxiety, anxious 
arousal); depression measured by MASQ (general distress: depression, anhedonia); optimism meas-
ured by LOT-R; ER variables measured by difficulties (DERS); and reported regulation strategy used 
during the angry-reappraise condition measured by the ERQ-SF were used to predict the three re-
sponse types (neutral, positive, or negative) endorsed by participants (see Table 1 for descriptives).
Figure 1. Effect of ER on mean 
(95% CI) negative affect scores 
across MIPs.
**Level of significant at p < .001
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All mood, emotion regulation, and participant variables (e.g. age) were analyzed to identify zero-
order correlations with each response type (Table 2) Only those variables with significant zero-order 
relationships at an alpha level of .01 were entered into the regressions as predictors. None of these 
variables were significantly related to neutral responses in any of the conditions. Thus, regressions 
predicting only positive and negative responses in each condition are detailed below. The variation 
inflation factor (VIF) of these variables, for each model, was less than 1.15 indicating little effect of 
multicollinearity (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995).
5.4.1. Baseline
Since these variables have not previously been used to predict interpretation bias, we first evaluated 
their relationship to response type at baseline. Given significant zero-order relationships, trait anger, 
anhedonia, optimism, and difficulties in ER were entered into a linear multiple regression and signifi-
cantly predicted baseline positive responses (F (4, 91) = 5.78, p < .001; R2 = .20). State anger, anhedo-
nia, and optimism were included in the regression to predict a significant relationship with baseline 
negative responses (F (3, 92) = 4.22, p < .01; R2 = .12). None of the variables in either model were 
unique predictors.
Table 2. Zero-order correlations with response type across conditions
*Level of significant at p < .05.
**Level of significant at p < .01.
***Level of significant at p < .001.
Anger 
–Trait
Anger 
–State
Anxiety Anx. 
Arousal
Dep. Anhed. LOT-R DERS ERQ-SF 
Reapp.
ERQ-SF 
Supp.
Baseline (N = 96)
Positive −.293** −.083 −.078 .014 −.097 −.358*** .343** −.381*** – –
Negative .225* .269** .107 .033 .119 .272** −.283** .249* – –
Neutral .140 −.164 −.005 −.055 .005 .158 −.132 .230* – –
Angry-Attend 
(N = 102)
Positive −.193 −.320** −.098 .056 −.177 −.319** .477*** −.235* – –
Negative .221* .374*** .102 .049 .238* .247** −.357*** .265** – –
Neutral −.011 −.026 .004 −.116 −.048 .106 −.172 −.010 – –
Angry-Reappraise 
(N = 102)
Positive −.151 −.166 −.080 .083 −.152 −.333** .409*** −.266** .286** −.013
Negative .219* .280** .190 −.048 .283** .321** −.368*** .290** −.383*** −.079
Neutral −.092 −.128 −.088 −.013 −.092 .088 −.088 .006 .044 .063
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of dispositional variables
Mean SD Obs. range
STAXI
 Trait 16.83 4.70 10–34
 State 17.31 4.83 15–46
MASQ
 Anxiety 21.52 7.05 11–45
 Anxious arousal 23.25 8.09 16–58
 Depression 24.95 9.04 12–51
 Anhedonia 51.00 11.01 28–84
LOT-R 15.95 4.07 4–24
DERS 76.31 18.64 37–117
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5.4.2. Angry-attend
A multiple regression analysis was used to predict responses while attending to anger, after first 
controlling for baseline response tendencies. As such, positive responses were entered into the first 
block; then, state anger, anhedonia, and optimism were entered into the second block and predicted 
a significantly larger proportion of the variance in positive responses than the baseline positive re-
sponses. Additionally, optimism uniquely predicted increases in positive responses, while state an-
ger uniquely predicted decreases in positive responses (Table 3).
To predict negative responses in this condition, baseline negative responses were entered in the 
first block and significantly predicted negative responses. Again, state anger, anhedonia, and opti-
mism were included along with difficulties in ER. Optimism and state anger remained unique predic-
tors, but instead predicted decreases and increases in negative responses, respectively (Table 4).
5.4.3. Angry-reappraise
Baseline positive or negative responses were entered into the first block of multiple regressions to 
significantly predict positive and negative responses, respectively, after anger reappraisal. 
Table 4. Summary of multiple regression analysis for participant variables predicting negative responses (N = 96)
*Level of significant at p < .05.
**Level of significant at p < .01.
Angry-Attend Angry-Reappraise
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β
Baseline negative responses .37 .13 .28** .17 .13 .13 .37 .13 .29** .12 .13 .1
State Anger .07 .03 .27** .01 .03 .04
Depression – – – .03 .02 .21
Anhedonia −.01 .01 −.07 −0.01 .01 −.07
Optimism −.10 .04 −.30** −0.06 .04 −.19
DERS .01 .01 .08 .00 .01 .04
ERQ-SF – – – −.12 .04 −.29**
R2 .08 .26 .08 .29
F for change in R2 7.66** 5.58** 8.37** 4.11**
Table 3. Summary of multiple regression analysis for participant variables predicting positive responses (N = 96)
*Level of significant at p < .05.
**Level of significant at p < .01.
***Level of significant at p ≤ .001.
Angry-Attend Angry-Reappraise
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β
Baseline positive responses .47 .12 .39*** .32 .11 .27** .25 .11 .22* .07 .12 .07
State Anger −.06 .03 −.20* – – –
Anhedonia .01 .01 .08 −.01 .01 −.08
Optimism .13 .04 .38*** .07 .04 .21
DERS – – – −.01 .01 −.09
ERQ-SF – – – 0.1 .05 .21*
R2 .15 .33 .05 .21
F for change in R2 16.50*** 8.25*** 4.65* 4.63**
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Anhedonia, optimism, difficulties in ER, and reappraisal were entered into the second block to signifi-
cantly predict positive responses. To predict negative responses, all variables except anxiety and 
anxious arousal were entered to significantly predict negative responses. After controlling for base-
line responses, reappraisal was the only unique predictor for the increased positive and decreased 
negative responses (Tables 3 and 4).
6. Discussion
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether ER changed how angry participants interpreted 
ambiguous stimuli. Additionally, this study aimed to elucidate the relationship between disposition-
al variables (e.g. optimism) and the types of interpretations individuals make in angry states. We first 
confirmed that participants entered the study with the typical positive/neutral interpretation bias 
found in non-clinical samples. When an angry mood was induced, participants increased their en-
dorsements of negative responses, and decreased the number of neutral ones, relative to the con-
trol induction. This pattern of responses was uniquely predicted by state anger and optimism. When 
participants actively used reappraisal, subjective negative affect decreased, but there was no effect 
on interpretation bias. Still, positive and negative resolutions of ambiguity were uniquely predicted 
by reported use of reappraisal.
Overall, these findings are consistent with the current literature and extend the findings on inter-
pretation bias in the context of emotion. As expected, angry mood led to increased negative inter-
pretations of ambiguous scenarios (Barazzone & Davey, 2009; Wenzel & Lystad, 2005). However, in 
contrast to our hypothesis, we did not observe a reduction in negative interpretations once partici-
pants reappraised their negative affect. Thus, although participants explicitly reported less negative 
affect after reappraisal, which is consistent with other studies (Mauss et al., 2007; Memedovic, 
Grisham, Denson, & Moulds, 2010), this did not result in an implicit change in the way that they cog-
nitively processed ambiguous information. One possibility for this finding is that affective networks 
had already been accessed (Bower, 1981), and the brief reappraisal period could not override the 
cognitive processing that had already been initiated. Although researchers have found success mod-
ifying interpretations through cognitive means, such changes require repetitive active engagement 
(Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend, & Mackintosh, 2010). Hence, changing interpretation bias in the context of 
anger may require both active affective and cognitive changes (Standage, Ashwin, & Fox, 2010). 
Future studies might choose to engage participants in an active manipulation of both ER and cogni-
tive bias to determine whether there is an additive effect of managing affect and cognitions.
Currently, we observed the combined influence of affect and cognition by measuring dispositional 
factors. The linear combination of anger, anhedonia, and optimism predicted positive and negative 
responses at baseline, although none were unique predictors. This is consistent with Barazzone and 
Davey (2009) and Huppert et al. (2007) who demonstrated correlations between negative interpre-
tations and trait anger and depression, respectively. Notably, our anxiety measures were not signifi-
cantly related to response type. A fair amount of work in this area has targeted individuals with 
clinically elevated anxiety/anxiety disorders, given their tendency to make negative interpretations 
of ambiguous stimuli (Franklin, Huppert, Langner, Leiberg, & Foa, 2005; Huppert et al., 2007). The 
current findings suggest anxiety is not a driving factor in a non-clinical sample of undergraduates 
with low anxiety. This is supported by Hirsch & Mathews, (1997), who demonstrate that general 
negative affect, not anxiety specifically, appears to influence interpretation bias. Indeed, as one 
would expect, state anger uniquely predicted increases in negative interpretations and decreases in 
positive ones above baseline responses when participants attended to anger. Yet, as predicted, it 
was no longer a unique predictor once participants engaged in reappraisal.
Optimism also emerged as a unique predictor for positive and negative responses when partici-
pants attended to anger. Optimism predicted increased positive responses and decreased negative 
ones. This is generally consistent with Lerner and Tiedens Lerner & Tiedens, (2006) assessment of 
the interaction between anger and optimism. Angry individuals increase their perception of positive 
outcomes as they pertain to the self (as was the case with the current stimuli). So, although the 
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number of negative interpretations increased during anger, positive interpretations remained con-
sistent with control conditions and were still overall more abundant. An alternative explanation is 
that feelings of certainty and control during anger, as predicted by the appraisal tendency theory 
(Lerner & Keltner, 2000), may be interacting with trait optimism such that positive responses be-
come more salient. Either way, dispositional optimism appears to counteract the influence of nega-
tive affect during anger (Ausbrooks, Thomas, & Williams, 1995) by decreasing negative and 
increasing positive interpretations.
With regard to the effects of ER on interpretation, the current findings indicate that active reap-
praisal predicts increased positive and decreased negative responses. Interestingly, optimism is not 
a unique predictor during the reappraisal condition. We suspect the cognitive mechanisms that con-
tribute to dispositional optimism are involved with explicit reappraisal. Indeed, in exploratory analy-
ses (see supplemental data), when dispositional variables and ER variables are entered in separate 
models, optimism uniquely predicts responses in the angry reappraise condition. The current analy-
ses demonstrate that this variance is likely accounted for by explicitly reappraising—or thinking 
positively.
This study demonstrates that ER and dispositional factors, like optimism, influence interpretation 
bias in the face of angry emotion. While these findings extend the current literature, there are a few 
limitations that should be noted. For instance, we are unable to separate implicit ER from the explicit 
instructions in this study. Yet, it is reasonable to assume that whatever implicit processes partici-
pants used were occurring throughout. Additionally, the range for depression and anxiety was lim-
ited in this sample so those characteristics may have a greater effect on these findings than we are 
able to test for.
Still, this study demonstrates that not only does emotion and its regulation influence the way in-
dividuals process information, but personality characteristics such as optimism also have a signifi-
cant influence on interpretations of ambiguous scenarios. These findings extend work conducted 
with clinical populations that show those with depression (Hindash & Amir, 2012) and difficulties 
regulating anger (Erwin et al., 2003) are more likely to endorse negative interpretations. It suggests 
that even in typically healthy participants, an overall negative disposition leads to increased nega-
tive interpretation of ambiguous scenarios. While this, perhaps, has been presumed, this is the first 
study to use a combination of personality characteristics to understand the dispositional influences 
on the interpretation of ambiguity in the context of negative mood.
This study also adds to the current interpretation bias and ER literature by demonstrating that 
cognitive reappraisal is an effective tool to reduce negative emotionality in angry mood states. 
Individuals who experience high state anger or typically struggle to engage in healthy ER experi-
enced greater negative emotionality and an increased negativity bias following instructed reap-
praisal. Yet, despite efficacy of regulating negative emotionality in anger, cognitive reappraisal is not 
sufficient for modulating snap judgments once mood is initiated. Therefore, for individuals who pre-
sent for treatment with difficulties related to anger and everyday negativity bias, clinicians may 
need to provide additional ER skills that could include enhancing positive perspective-taking.
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